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ABSTRACT
The relevance of cognitive penetration has been pointed out concerning three fields 
within philosophy: philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. This 
paper argues that this phenomenon is also relevant to the philosophy of language. First, 
I will defend that there are situations where ethical, social, or cultural rules can affect our 
taste perceptions. This influence can cause speakers to utter conflicting contents that 
lead them to disagree and, subsequently, to negotiate the circumstances of application 
of the taste predicates they have used to describe or express their taste perceptions. 
Then, to account for the proper dynamics of these cases, I will develop a theoretical 
framework build upon two elements: the Lewisian idea of the score of a conversation 
(Lewis, 1979), and Richard’s (2008) taxonomy of the different attitudes speakers can 
have in taste disagreements. In a nutshell, I will argue that speakers can accommodate 
these conflicting contents as exceptions to the rule that determines the circumstances 
of application of taste predicates.
Keywords: Cognitive penetration, Common ground, Circumstances of application, Accom-
modation, Exceptions, Score of the conversation, Taste predicates.
RESUMO 
A relevância da penetração cognitiva foi apontada em três campos dentro da filosofia: 
na filosofia da ciência, na filosofia da mente e na epistemologia. Este artigo argumenta 
que este fenômeno é também relevante para a filosofia da linguagem. Primeiro, de-
fenderei que existem situações em que as regras éticas, sociais, ou culturais podem 
afetar as nossas percepções de gosto. Esta influência pode levar os falantes a proferir 
conteúdos contraditórios que os levam a discordar e, subsequentemente, a negociar 
as circunstâncias de aplicação dos predicados de gosto que utilizaram para descrever 
ou expressar as suas percepções de gosto. Depois, para explicar a dinâmica adequada 
destes casos, desenvolverei um quadro teórico baseado em dois elementos: a ideia 
lewisiana da pontuação de uma conversa (Lewis, 1979), e a taxonomia de Richard (2008) 
das diferentes atitudes que os oradores podem ter nas discordâncias de gosto. Em re-
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Introduction
Food is becoming increasingly important in today’s soci-
eties. It has a direct influence on individuals, but it is also crucial 
in defining and shaping the different cultural identities that ex-
ist throughout the world. In this context, knowing what we eat 
is critical. For example, stamps warning about products with a 
high content of fats or sugar are becoming more frequent. In 
the same way, the origin and the traceability of the products we 
consume is becoming more and more important for people of 
different countries (Loureiro and Umberger, 2007; du Plessis 
and du Rand, 2012; van Rijswijk and Frewer, 2012; Sun, Wang 
and Zhang, 2017). It is also essential to know what can be eat-
en in a given culture, or even how something can or should be 
eaten, to resp ect sp ecific cultural and social policies. However, 
on certain occasions, knowing what we are eating can have con-
sequences that we would not have previously susp ected. Some-
times, knowing what we are eating can lead us to disagree with 
other people, frequently with people belonging to a different 
culture, on the circumstances of application of the predicates 
we use to describe or evaluate the things we eat.
It is commonplace in the literature (Vahid, 2014; Stokes, 
2015) to say that the thesis of cognitive penetration would have 
significant consequences for three areas within philosophy. 
First, on the philosophy of science, concerning theory-laden-
ness of perception and the consequences this may have for sci-
entific theories. Second, on the philosophy of mind, in partic-
ular with the architecture of mind. Third, on epistemology, in 
particular about the epistemic role of perception.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to show that 
cognitive penetration is also relevant to the philosophy of 
language. I will argue that cognitive states such as know-
ing that the dish is made with whale meat or believing that 
the dish is made of cat meat can affect taste perceptions. In 
some instances, this influence can make sp eakers say things 
that make them disagree and, subsequently, negotiate on the 
circumstances of application of the “predicates of personal 
taste” (Lasersohn, 2005) they have used in those situations.3
Specifically, I will contend that there are cases of cognitive 
penetration where ethical, social, or cultural rules affect our 
taste perceptions, and where sp eakers accommodate these 
conflicting contents as exceptions to the rule determining the 
circumstances of application of “tasty”. Following MacFarlane 
(2014), I will consider that “the TP Rule” (MacFarlane, 2014, 
p. 4) is the rule determining the use of taste predicates,4 but 
I will defend that there can be cases in which sp eakers can 
consider exceptions to this rule.
Second, I will provide a theoretical framework to explain 
the proper dynamics of these cases. To do this, I will rely on two 
ideas. First, I will follow those theories that conceive context 
as common ground. According to Stalnaker (2002, 2014), the 
notion of common ground has been understood in two differ-
ent ways: as the central component of the score of a language 
game (Lewis, 1979), and as a complex state definable in terms 
of the propositional attitudes of the participants in a conversa-
tion (Grice, 1989). In this paper, I will take the Lewisian route, 
arguing that the exceptions the sp eakers introduce to the TP 
Rule can be understood as a component of the score of the con-
versation. Second, I will apply Richard’s (2008) taxonomy con-
cerning taste disagreements to accurately depict the attitudes 
and stances of the sp eakers involved in this type of situation.
The plan for the paper is as follows. In Section 1, I will 
briefly explain what is cognitive penetration, and I will defend 
that the central cases presented in this paper are instances of 
cognitive penetration. In Section 2, I will define the essential 
elements for a proper charact erization of the dynamics of the 
cases: the sp ecifications of the kinematics of the circumstances 
of application of taste predicates, and the rule of accommoda-
tion for exceptions. In Section 3, I will provide an example in 
which sp eakers accommodate conflicting contents as excep-
tions to the TP rule, and I will show how they add these excep-
tions to the common ground of the conversation. In Section 4, 
I will present Richard’s (2008) taxonomy concerning the atti-
tudes sp eakers can have in a taste disagreement. I will defend 
that this taxonomy is a perfect fit to account for the cases that 
are the focus of this work. Finally, I will draw some conclusions.
1. When Cognitive Penetration 
Met Philosophy of Language
Egil Bjarnasson, in his Al Jazeeras’s news article titled 
“Tourism boosts Iceland’s whaling industry,” says: 
sumo, argumentarei que os oradores podem acomodar estes conteúdos contraditórios como exceções à regra que 
determina as circunstâncias de aplicação dos predicados de gosto.
Palavras-chave: Penetração cognitiva, Terreno comum, Circunstâncias de aplicação, Acomodação, Excepções, Pontua-
ção da conversa, Predicados de gosto.
3 In this paper, I will focus on “tasty,” but the main idea can be applied to other predicates of personal taste or taste predicates for short.
4 As MacFarlane, I will understand the TP Rule as a use rule, that is, a rule that determines the circumstances of application of taste 
predicates. Since MacFarlane presents a specific rule for assertion (MacFarlane, 2014, p. 101), it seems reasonable to assume that the 
TP rule is a use rule.
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Reykjavik, Iceland - Ready to try grilled 
minke whale skewers, the “Moby Dick on a 
Stick”, as the dish is advertised by The Sea-
baron restaurant, a British tourist observes, 
“looks like a Turkish kebab.” Taking a bite, 
he adds, “Tastes indeed like red meat and 
poor ethics.”5
Eating whale meat is certainly not common, at least not 
in many cultures around the globe. Whale meat may taste like 
red meat, as the tourist of the article says. However, for many 
people, this may not be, by far, the most relevant asp ect to de-
scribe or assess the grilled minke whale skewers served in the 
Seabaron rest aurant. As the tourist of the article also notes, 
whale meat not only tastes like red meat. It also tastes like 
“poor ethics.” Perhaps this is a somewhat enigmatic statement, 
but it also stresses something meaningful for this work. Some-
times, when describing or assessing how something tastes, we 
may not only have to take into account the physical elements 
responsible for the flavor of the dish.
On the contrary, in certain cases, a cognitive state such 
as belief or knowledge may affect our perceptions of taste. In 
other words, cognition may penetrate taste perception. While 
many studies addressing cognitive penetration focus on visual 
perception (MacPherson, 2012; Cecchi, 2014, 2018; Vetter 
and Newen, 2014; Silins, 2016; Newen and Vetter, 2017; 
Raftopoulos, 2016, 2019), only a few have focused on taste 
perception (Wansink et al., 2000; McClure et al., 2004; Lee, 
Frederick and Ariely, 2006). 
Cognitive penetration is usually defined saying that cog-
nitive states such as beliefs, thoughts, desires, expectations, 
concepts, or intentions can directly influence our perceptual 
experience. Although defining cognitive penetration in a the-
oretically satisfactory way can be a difficult task (see Mach-
ery, 2015; Stokes, 2014; Silins, 2016), it is helpful to adopt a 
definition that allows us to explore the different issues related 
with cognitive penetration. In this work, I will follow Silins’s 
definition, according to which:
(…) experience is cognitively penetra-
ble just in case the following scenario is 
posible: two people are the same with re-
spect to their sensory inputs, the state of 
their sensory organ, and the orientation of 
their attention, and they are still different 
with respect to what their experience is like, 
because of their beliefs, desires, or other 
cognitive states (Silins, 2016, p. 27).
In short, if two people eat the same, have similar sensory 
systems, and similarly direct their attention and, even so, they 
have different perceptions due to their beliefs or desires, then 
one can sp eak of cognitive penetration. Although the existing 
literature on cognitive penetration in taste perception is not 
too extensive, scenarios like the one depicted by Silins’s defi-
nition are entirely possible.
Suppose that Eric and Erik are clones, and both have 
been living in the same environment for their entire lives. 
Their memories are also the same, with the only difference 
that Eric remembers having had a horse during his child-
hood. Suppose now that they are going to eat at a Japanese 
rest aurant and Erik orders basashi, a sashimi-like dish made 
from the meat of horse. The waiter brings the dish to the 
table and, both knowing what the dish is made of, they try 
it. In this situation, it is reasonable to think that the condi-
tions set out in the definition are fitted. First, their sensory 
inputs are equal since the elements of the dish are the same 
for both. Second, we can suppose that their sensory systems 
are very similar in crucial resp ects. After all, both are clones, 
and both have lived all along in similar environments. Third, 
we can also suppose that the direction of their attention is 
very similar. In fact, it is easily imaginable that their atten-
tion is directed towards the same thing, since the variety of 
elements –the meat and the sauce– does not certainly dis-
tinguish sashimi-like dishes. However, we can imagine that 
their taste perceptions are different. Eric remembers having 
had a horse during his childhood, something Erik does not 
remember, and this can affect him by making his perception 
of the basashi unpleasant.
It might be thought that for most people, these types of 
issues do not have much relevance in determining taste per-
ceptions. Perhaps, for most people, the only things that count 
most of the time to say that something is “tasty” are the in-
gredients of the dish and the exact amount of each of them. 
However, according to Burnston’s (2017) “scaling argument,” 
“the more high-level, categorical, socially-mediated, and 
learning-dependent a percept is, the more likely it is to be the 
result of CP [cognitive penetration]” (Burnston, 2017, p.1).
Taste perception is unquestionably socially-mediated. 
What we love or hate to eat depends, among other things, on 
the society or culture to which we belong. Although there may 
be certain overlaps due to geographical proximity, for example, 
in Mediterranean cultures, the use of olive oil is widespread, the 
most typical dishes of many cultures are very different. Con-
sider, for example, the differences between Spanish and Syrian 
cuisine. Besides, taste perception is also learning-dependent. 
Although first-hand knowledge is sufficient for many people to 
consider someone’s tastes as reasonable, many people try to re-
fine their taste through learning (see Smith, 2007; MacFarlane, 
2014). In many situations, the more knowledge I have of the 
object I taste, the more pleasure I can get of it. Although some-
one might think this is elitist, the truth is that taste education is 
reaching more and more places and people every day. Consider, 
as proof of this, the enormous number of tasting courses on of-
fer today. The wine tasting courses are undoubtedly the most 
popular since long ago, but other options comprise beer, coffee, 
chocolate, oil, cheese, or whiskey tasting courses.
5 https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/tourism-boosts-iceland-whaling-industry-170130093819369.html.
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So, cognitive penetration where ethical, social, or cul-
tural rules affect our taste perceptions is something we have 
to look at carefully. The influence that some of these sub-
jects can have on taste perception has already been observed 
in the literature:
However, the modern problem is different. 
Cultural influences on our behavioral pref-
erences for food and drink are now inter-
twined with biological expediency that 
shaped the early version of the underlying 
preference mechanisms. In many cases, cul-
tural influences dominate what we eat and 
drink. Behavioral evidence suggests that 
cultural messages can insinuate themselves 
into the decision-making processes that 
yield preferences for one consumable or 
another (McClure, 2004, p. 379).
How culture and society influence our taste preferences 
has been studied, for example, in product labeling (Wansink 
et al., 2000), or product brand (McClure, 2004). Although 
this is a topic of great interest, in this paper, I will focus on a 
subject little explored in the literature about cognitive pen-
etration in taste perception. I will examine those cases in 
which the influence of ethical, social, or cultural rules affects 
taste perceptions, making that sp eakers utter conflicting con-
tents that lead them to disagree and eventually to negotiate 
on the circumstances of application of the predicates they 
have used. Therefore, the ultimate interest of the article is not 
in the taste perceptions themselves, but in the predicates the 
sp eakers use to describe or express those perceptions.
2. Scorekeeping in a 
tasting game
After showing that there can be cases in which ethical, 
social, or cultural rules cognitively penetrate our perception 
of taste, the objective now is to propose an explanation of the 
proper dynamics of these types of cases, placing particular em-
phasis on the circumstances of application of taste predicates.
MacFarlane (2014) contends that the rule determin-
ing the use of a predicate such as “tasty” is the Taste Pleasing 
(TP) Rule: “If you know first-hand how something tastes, 
call it ‘tasty’ just in case its flavour is pleasing to you, and ‘not 
tasty’ just in case its flavour is not pleasing to you” (MacFar-
lane, 2014, p. 4). I agree with MacFarlane that the rule that 
determines the use of taste predicates is the TP Rule. How-
ever, as already shown, there may be cases where, because of 
cognitive penetration, there are other rules that may be rel-
evant. As said, I will follow MacFarlane in considering the 
TP Rule as a use rule, but I will accept the possibility that 
sp eakers consider exceptions to TP. I will treat the set of 
exceptions that are relevant in the context as a component 
of the score of the conversation. 
Lewis (1979) stated that just as the score in a baseball 
game allows you to know the state of the game, the score of 
a conversation would allow you to know the state of a given 
conversation at each stage. A baseball game is an attainable 















I would add two other elements to the septuple suggest-
ed by Lewis: i) what bases are loaded and the position in the 
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a runner on first base and the pitcher batting than to have 
the bases loaded when the cleanup hitter is in the box. So, the 


















Maybe Lewis did not explicitly add these elements to 
the score because they are recognizable by merely looking di-
rectly at the game, at least what bases are loaded. In the same 
sense, there are features of a conversation (e.g., who is the 
sp eaker) that are recognizable just joining or being part of a 
conversation. However, others require certain knowledge of 
the conversational score, for example, what presuppositions 
are part of the common ground at a given moment or, in our 
case, what exceptions to the TP Rule sp eakers are considering.
Be that as it may, the general idea is that a quick look to 
the score is enough to know the state of the game at a partic-
ular stage. However, knowing the different elements making 
up the score of a conversation at a given point could be more 
challenging than in the case of a baseball game. Nevertheless, 
as Lewis stresses, there are certain points of similarity be-
tween these two scenarios, the main ones being:
•  Both scores can be represented by a set of components 
that are abstract entities. In the case of the score of a 
baseball game: the number of runs, the inning, or the 
number of outs, balls, and strikes at a given moment. 
In the case of a conversational score: sets of presuppo-
sitions, permissible or impermissible courses of act ion, 
rankings of salience for definite descriptions, standards 
of precision, or the exceptions to the TP Rule that are 
relevant.
•  Both the score of a baseball game and the score of a 
conversation “evolves in a more-or-less rule-governed 
way.” (Lewis, 1979, p. 345).
When a given sp eaker says that something is “tasty,” 
the TP Rule is the rule that entitles her to use the predicate. 
However, in certain situations, other rules can make that the 
sp eakers consider exceptions to the TP Rule. Here is the defi-
nition of the kinematics of the circumstances of application 
of taste predicates:
 Specifications of the kinematics of the circumstances of ap-
plication of tast e predicates: Initially, the rule that entitles 
David Bordonaba-Plou
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sp eakers to say that something is tasty is the TP Rule: 
call something “tasty” if its flavor is pleasing to you and 
you know first-hand how it tastes. After that, if between 
t and t’ sp eakers behave in manner m (i.e. uttering a con-
flicting content), one or more exceptions to TP can be 
considered to be relevant in the context.
Speakers can consider certain exceptions to the TP 
Rule. The participants in the conversation will accept these 
exceptions as part of the common ground if the assertion of 
the sp eaker is to be acceptable. Let us consider a context in 
which TP is at stake. Speaker A and Speaker B are eating at 
A’s house. Speaker A offers Speaker B some food, and both 
of them say that the dish is tasty. At some point in the con-
versation, Speaker A reaffirms his position by an utterance 
that adds new information, updating in this way the context. 
In other words, through a “manifest event,” i.e., through “(…) 
something that happens in the environment of the relevant 
parties that is obviously evident to all” (Stalnaker, 2014, p. 47), 
in this case, an utterance that adds new information to the 
context, he tries to make the asserted content be part of the 
common ground, while TP is the rule at stake. At this point, 
suppose that Speaker B expresses disagreement with Speaker 
A because Speaker B considers the new content and TP as 
part of the common ground to be jointly incompatible. Now, 
Speaker A can accept as common ground both the new con-
tent and TP if she accepts the information added by the new 
content as an exception to TP. In other words, sp eakers can 
“accommodate” (Lewis, 1979) these new conflicting contents 
as exceptions to the TP Rule as the conversation evolves. Here 
is the definition of the rule of accommodation for exceptions:
 Rule of accommodation for exceptions: If at time t one 
sp eaker says something (a conflicting content) that pro-
duce a disagreement with other sp eaker, sp eakers can 
accept these new content as an exception to the TP 
Rule. If the exception was not present before t, then the 
exception can be taken as part of the common ground 
at t.
In the above example, one option is that Speaker A con-
cedes to Speaker B that the exception is part of the common 
ground.6 If that were the case, a new component would arise 
in the score of the conversation, the set of exceptions that are 
relevant for saying that something is “tasty.” From that mo-
ment, knowing the circumstances of application of “tasty” in 
that context will imply knowing what exceptions the partic-
ipants in the conversation have accepted as part of the com-
mon ground.
It may be argued that accommodation is not a general 
way in which sp eakers account for those changes that arise 
in the course of a conversation. However, on the face of the 
number of changes and the different kinds of change a con-
text might undergo, I will take accommodation as a necessary 
feature of any disagreement involving taste predicates.
3. Tastes, rules, and exceptions
Considering the set of exceptions as a component of the 
score of the conversation allows us to account for those cases 
in which ethical, social, or cultural rules make an impact on 
the circumstances of application of taste predicates. To have 
first-hand knowledge of the object of which sp eakers are ex-
pressing their gustatory preference is key in many situations, 
but, as the conversation goes, sp eakers can say something 
that makes sp eakers disagree, being possible to accommodate 
these conflicting new contents as exceptions to TP. 
In the remainder of this section, I will present an exam-
ple to illustrate the ideas defended so far in the paper. How-
ever, before continuing, a proviso is necessary. The examples 
depicting taste disagreements (Glanzberg, 2007; Huvenes, 
2012; Lasersohn, 2005; López de Sa, 2008, 2015; MacFarlane, 
2014) typically consist of one sp eaker saying p and the other 
sp eaker saying q (where q implies not-p). Such examples make 
it impossible to illustrate those cases in which the sp eakers 
consider exceptions to TP. The example-style I will use can 
be found in other authors (Stevenson, 1944; Schaffer, 2011; 
Blome-Tillmann, 2014). Like them, I will present larger and 
more complex pieces of discourse to show the sp ecific kine-
matics of these cases.
Now, consider two sp eakers, Mike and Pedro, eating the 
typical dish of the Cañete gastronomic festival:
1)  Pedro: Umm, it’s really tasty. It’s been a long time 
since I’ve tried it.
2)  Mike: Yes, it’s really tasty. What kind of meat is in 
the dish?
3)  Pedro: You don’t know? It’s cat meat.
4)  Mike: Cat meat? Are you kidding me? This is the 
most disgusting thing I’ve ever tried.
Pedro and Mike agree on (1) and (2) that the dish is tasty: 
the flavor of the dish is appealing for both sp eakers, so both of 
them are willing to express their approval of the dish by calling it 
“tasty.” Suppose that Mike presupposes that it is rabbit or chick-
en meat, and Pedro presupposes that it is common ground that 
the dish is made of cat meat. Pedro could think that someone 
who goes to the Cañete gastronomic festival knows that one of 
its most prominent features is that the dishes are made with cat 
meat. Mike’s question in (2) indicates that he does not know 
what meat is in the dish, and then it is common ground that 
he does not know the type of meat in the dish. After that, since 
Pedro knows that Mike does not know which type of meat is, 
6 Other option for Speaker A is trying to change Speaker B’s beliefs in such a way that Speaker B accepts that both the new information 
and the TP Rule are part of the common ground.
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Pedro asserts (3). Now it is common ground that it is cat meat. 
Once Pedro updates the context in (3) adding the information 
“cat meat,” Mike has two options.
On the one hand, he can accept as common ground both 
that the dish is made of cat and that TP determines the cir-
cumstances of application of “tasty.” On the other hand, he 
can refuse to accept either as common ground. In this case, 
Mike opts for this second option, expressing his disapproval 
of the dish in (4). If Mike had not said anything, Pedro would 
have taken for granted that he accepts as common ground 
both that the dish is made of cat and that TP is the only ele-
ment determining the circumstances of application of “tasty.” 
According to Stalnaker (2014), sp eakers can realize that 
the conversational context is defective, for example, when 
“(…) it becomes manifest that you are presupposing some-
thing that I don’t, or didn’t, believe” (Stalnaker, 2014, p. 47). 
He identifies three ways7 for sp eakers to accommodate these 
situations. Following with the example, after Mike’s utterance 
of (4), here we have a situation when one sp eaker, Pedro, has 
several options to accommodate this “defect” of the conversa-
tion. First, he may accommodate it by changing his belief and 
taking it to be common ground that eating cat meat in the 
Cañete gastronomic festival is disgusting. In doing so, Peter 
would accommodate the new conflicting content “cat meat” 
as an exception to the TP rule. One consequence of this move 
is that the exception to TP would be relevant in the context, 
and the circumstances of application of “tasty” would no lon-
ger depend exclusively on the TP Rule, but instead on TP plus 
the exception. We could summarize the new circumstances 
of application as follows: call something “tasty” if its flavor is 
pleasing to you, and you know first-hand how it tastes unless 
you are eating the meat of a pet.8
However, Pedro can also try to challenge Mike’s point. Con-
sider the following possible development of the conversation:
5)  Pedro: Wow, this is unbelievable. You knew you were 
going to come to the festival but you didn’t even 
check what kind of festival it is? Ok, I’ll tell you the 
story. The festival is a hallmark for African-Peruvi-
ans. It’s devoted to Santa Efigenia, an Ethiopian black 
virgin, one of the people responsible for the spread of 
Catholicism in Africa, and one of the few black rep-
resentations of the Virgin in the world. I don’t know 
exactly why cats are eaten in the festival, but I don’t 
think it’s so important. The festival is now a distin-
guishing mark for Peruvians with African ancestry, 
not a majority in Peru, as you might guess.
6)  Mike: That story makes all the difference. I knew 
nothing about the importance and significance of 
the festival. Now, I understand why eating cat meat 
doesn’t bother you. In fact, I’m beginning to think 
that it’s not entirely appropriate to bluntly say that 
the dish is disgusting. In the end, eating cats is just 
a way to reinforce group cohesion in a discriminated 
minority. I think I’ll have to give it another chance.
In (5)-(6), another exception has been introduced, in 
particular an exception to the first exception. Now, the circum-
stances of application of “tasty” could be rendered as follows: 
call something “tasty” if its flavor is pleasing to you and you 
know first-hand how it tastes, unless it is pet meat, with the ex-
ception that it forms a significant part of a tradition that favors 
social cohesion. This last change has shifted again the condi-
tions under which it is permitted to say that the dish is “tasty.”
The exceptions that sp eakers introduce as the conver-
sation evolves can be of two kinds: primary and secondary 
exceptions. A primary exception is an exception to TP. In 
the example, it was “unless it is pet meat that you are eating.” 
Secondary exceptions are exceptions to primary exceptions. 
In the example, “(…) with the exception that it was a signifi-
cant part of a tradition that favors social cohesion.” Note that 
if the primary exception had been a different one, for example, 
“unless it is chimp meat that you are eating”, there would prob-
ably have been fewer possible secondary exceptions. Had the 
primary exception been “unless it is human meat that you are 
eating”, secondary exceptions would be admissible in only very 
few contexts. So, it can be said that primary exceptions coerce 
the range of possible secondary exceptions in a given situation.
To sum up, this example shows how the sp eaker’s stance 
change as the conversation evolves. In this process, sp eakers 
add new information to the context, and these new pieces of 
information are accommodated as exceptions that are rele-
vant for saying that the dish is tasty. Speakers agree at the be-
ginning, but after Pedro adds the conflicting information “cat 
meat,” Mike disagrees, trying that Pedro accepts an exception 
to TP. After that, Pedro adds the accordant information “so-
cial cohesion,” which adds a new exception. Mike finds this 
reasonable, and in the end, both of them accept TP, and both 
exceptions as common ground. 
It should be remembered that the disagreement is not 
about the exceptions that need to be considered to say that 
the dish is tasty. The set of exceptions is a component of the 
score of the conversation, and as such, it can evolve depending 
on the conversational moves of the sp eakers. The disagree-
ment between Pedro and Mike is a disagreement on whether 
the typical dish of Cañete’s gastronomic festival is tasty or not, 
as illustrated by the fact that, in the end, both sp eakers agree 
that the dish is tasty. However, we can ask ourselves, is it cor-
rect to say that Peter and Mike end up agreeing at the end of 
the conversation? Perhaps “agreement” is not the term that 
7 Since the third option is a variation on the first, I will confine myself to the strategies mentioned earlier: change my own belief or try 
to change the belief of the other party.
8 Note that being a pet is context-dependent. In different countries, people eat different pets. So, it is possible that the information “cat 
meat” would be conflicting in one context but not in another.
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best describes the situation reached by both at the end of the 
conversation. Maybe, we should not say that they agree, since 
although it is true that for Peter the dish is tasty, it is far from 
clear that for Mike it is.
4. Agreement, acceptance, 
deficiency and intolerability: 
Overcoming the agreement/
disagreement dichotomy
The example in the previous section is esp ecially illu-
minating because it exposes a situation that is difficult to ac-
count, at least taking into consideration most of the proposals 
available on the literature on taste disagreement. A large part 
of the works has framed disagreements on taste as “faultless 
disagreements” (Kölbel, 2003; Schaffer, 2011; MacFarlane, 
2014). A faultless disagreement is usually defined by saying 
that two sp eakers are in a faultless disagreement when: 
1)  Speaker A affirms or believes p; sp eaker B affirms or 
believes q (where q implies not-p)
2)  None of the sp eakers has made a mistake in stating or 
believing p or q.
For years there has been much ado about how a disagree-
ment where neither of the sp eakers is in error is possible. If it is a 
disagreement, then one of the parties will have made a mistake. 
If no one has made a mistake, then it is not a disagreement. 
These two contradictory but equally plausible ideas have made 
faultless disagreement a theoretical paradox to some extent. 
For this reason, some authors (Glanzberg, 2007; Stojanovic, 
2007; Buekens, 2011; Rovane, 2012) have rejected the possi-
bility of such disagreements, while other authors (Lasersohn, 
2005; López de Sa, 2008; Kölbel, 2003, 2009; Schaffer, 2011; 
Egan, 2014; Huvenes, 2012; Kompa, 2016; Wyatt, 2018) have 
tried to accommodate the phenomenon by developing theories 
designed explicitly for such a task.
The question of whether we should dismiss the idea of 
faultless disagreement or whether, on the contrary, we should 
accept it and try to explain it will not be directly relevant to 
the dialectic I pursue in this work. Instead, what matters here 
is to emphasize that most of the literature on taste disagree-
ments only uses the notions of agreement and disagreement 
to represent the attitudes the sp eakers have in conversations 
on matters of taste.
Nevertheless, this is a problem because these two notions 
are not sufficient to represent some of the attitudes that sp eak-
ers may have in this type of conversation, esp ecially if we con-
sider examples such as the one represented in (1)-(6). As we 
have seen, when sp eakers update the context by adding new 
information that has an impact on the circumstances of appli-
cation of taste predicates, one option for accommodating this 
new information may be to accept it as a primary or secondary 
exception. However, the attitudes sp eakers may adopt during 
or after that happen can hardly be categorized under the agree-
ment/disagreement dichotomy. To account for this deficiency, 
I will apply Richard’s (2008) taxonomy to the dynamic frame-
work presented in the previous sections. This will allow us to 
give a proper description of the attitudes sp eakers adopt in the 
type of cases presented. According to Richard:
There are two ways in which I could find 
your valuing x as cool or otherwise to be ap-
propriate. First of all, our perspectives could 
simply agree on x—we both, say, think x is 
cool. Or it could be that while we value x 
differently I acknowledge your perspective 
as one way to think, a way of valuing I have 
no reason to oppose that I think you ought 
to accept. I acknowledge that your attitude 
towards x is perfectly appropriate—I just 
don’t share it. I will call these attitudes to-
wards your valuing x as cool (or not cool, or 
handsome, or not sexy, or . . . ) agreement 
and acceptance respectively (Richard, 2008, 
p. 130).
Likewise, Richard (2008) unfolds in two the idea that we 
can disagree with someone:
There are also two ways in which I could find 
your valuing x in a certain way inappropri-
ate. First of all, even if I acknowledge your 
perspective and thus don’t find your eval-
uation in error, I may differ with you over 
whether there is a reason to find x is cool 
you ought accept. If I do, I find your valuing 
x liable to reproach; I, as I shall put it, find 
valuing x as you do deficient. In this case 
I may while acknowledging that yours is 
one acceptable way to go through life, try 
to convince you that there is a better way. 
Secondly, I may not just find your valuation 
of x deficient; I may think your perspective 
intolerable, one which does not constitute 
an aceptable way of looking at things. I may, 
that is, be intolerant of your judgment, inso-
far as it is a manifestation of a perspective 
on the matter at hand which I find unaccept-
able (Richard, 2008, p. 130).
In short, Richard (2008) makes more complex the 
panorama of available options to describe the attitudes 
or stances that the different parts can take in a taste dis-
agreement. Most of the literature dealing with this type of 
disagreements uses only the ideas of agreement or disagree-
ment to describe the positions that can be taken. However, 
when things are not so simple, for example, when sp eakers 
consider exceptions to the TP Rule, we need more options 
because the attitudes of the sp eakers cannot be described 
simply by saying that they agree or disagree.
Consider our toy example again. As already mentioned, 
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at first, both sp eakers seem to agree on thinking that the typ-
ical dish of the Cañete gastronomic festival is tasty. However, 
after Pedro updates the context in (3) with the conflicting in-
formation “cat meat,” Mike expresses his disagreement in (4) 
since he cannot accept both that the dish is made of cat and 
that TP is the only element determining the circumstances 
of application of “tasty.” Up to here, the notions of agreement 
and disagreement seem to be sufficient to describe the atti-
tudes of both sp eakers. However, after Mike says he finds it 
intolerable to call a dish made with cat meat tasty, Pedro ex-
plains to Mike the cultural and social background behind the 
celebration. Once Pedro explains this, and Mike understands 
the importance and meaning of the celebration, his attitude 
changes. Now, eating cat meat no longer seems intolerable, 
but acceptable. Understanding that the celebration is a way to 
reinforce group cohesion in a discriminated minority, Mike 
has no reason to oppose Pedro. Although he values the dish 
differently, after all, he does not think it is tasty, or at least 
not to the same extent as Pedro does, Mike recognizes Pedro’s 
position as one he has no reason to oppose. He understands it, 
but he does not share it.
In sum, Richards’s taxonomy gives us the conceptu-
al tools to describe in an appropriate way the attitudes that 
sp eakers have in those situations in which they consider ex-
ceptions to TP. The resulting theoretical framework is rich 
enough to illustrate in all its complexity the dynamics of ex-
amples such as (1)-(6) (see Table 1).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown that cognitive penetration 
has relevance not only to the three traditional areas in which 
the phenomenon has been studied – philosophy of science, 
philosophy of mind, and epistemology – but also to the phi-
losophy of language. I have argued that cognitive states related 
to ethical, social, or cultural rules can affect taste perceptions, 
and, depending on the conversational moves of the sp eakers, 
this can lead to a change in the circumstances of application
of the taste predicates sp eakers use to describe or express 
their taste perceptions. Specifically, sp eakers can consider ex-
ceptions to MacFarlane’s (2014) TP Rule. I acknowledge that 
TP is the rule determining the circumstances of application
of taste predicates, but I have shown that in some instances, 
sp eakers can consider exceptions to the TP Rule.
Then, to explain the proper dynamics of these cases, 
I have developed a theoretical framework build upon two 
elements. First, I have used the idea of context as common 
ground, more sp ecifically the Lewisian version of the idea. If 
one sp eaker updates the context with new information, while 
still upholding TP, the other party can express disagreement 
if he or she is unwilling to accept the new content and TP as 
common ground. One way to accommodate this is to add the 
content to the common ground as an exception to TP. I have 
provided the sp ecifications of the kinematics of the circum-
stances of application of taste predicates, and the rule of ac-
commodation for exceptions to provide a theoretical frame-
work to explain the proper dynamics of these cases. Second, 
I have used Richard’s (2008) taxonomy to properly illustrate 
the different attitudes sp eakers can have in these cases.
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